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Abstract: Nunberg maintains that there are cases like “I am traditionally 
entitled to a last meal”, as uttered by a condemned prisoner facing the 
firing squad, which suggest that an indexical like ‘I’ does double duty 
as a vehicle of singular and general reference . I argue against this claim . 
My position is that the sentence should be factored out into two: “Tra-
ditionally, a condemned prisoner is entitled to a last meal” and “I am 
a condemned prisoner” . Nunberg’s sentence is generated by means of 
an illicit substitution of ‘I’ for ‘a condemned prisoner’ inside the scope of 
‘traditionally’. The morale is that sloppy or literally nonsensical speech 
like Nunberg’s sentence is not suitable as data for logical analysis of 
natural language . What is suitable data is the two-premise argument 
I put forward .
Keywords: Nunberg, condemned prisoner, indexicals, logical analysis 
of natural language .
How are we to select the linguistic input data for logical analysis of 
natural language? To suggest an answer, let me start out with a brief 
preamble on the methodology of the enterprise of logical analysis of 
natural language, as I understand it . 
Natural language, as it is actually spoken and written, is riddled with 
sloppiness and nonsense of various degrees that we more often than 
1 Thanks to Marián Zouhar for useful comments . The paper was supported 
by Grant Agency of the Czech Republic Project 401/10/0792 Temporal	As-
pects	of	Knowledge	and	Information .
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not seem to be able to make good sense of in our day-to-day linguistic 
exchanges with one another . The primary reason is probably because 
linguistic transactions come embedded in practical situations in which 
we, as speakers and hearers, producers and consumers of language, 
can have recourse to extra-semantic factors like each other’s motives, 
intentions, common knowledge, shared beliefs, intonation, winks, 
nods, nudges, and whatever else, much of which is likely to elude full 
conceptualization. Being able to partake successfully in such transac-
tions is a cornerstone of human life and an all-important prerequisite 
for a human to be considered a fully functional human being and a full-
fledged member of a given culture, including its speech community. 
You need to get the point, and get it quickly, to count as a member of 
a speech community, even when what you are required to process as 
input data is, strictly speaking, nonsensical . In this regard, pragmat-
ics, rather than syntax or semantics, is by far the most important of the 
three parts of semiotics, when it comes to natural language . 
However, exactly because natural language is so intimately interwo-
ven with extra-linguistic practices, fragments of natural language can-
not, in their raw state, be fed into a framework or system of logical or 
formal or strictly semantic analysis . Such a framework accepts as input 
data only cleaned-up, clean-shaven, sanitized pieces of language. This 
much ought to be uncontroversial (but most likely is not) .
The reason I am bringing this up is because there is a cluster of one-
liners and miniature dialogues, due to Nunberg (1993), that various 
philosophers of language have attempted to analyze as though these 
sentences were already primed for semantic analysis . They are not, in 
my view . They are too close to being raw data imported from actual 
natural language for them to be amenable to semantic analysis . They 
are, in my view, typical examples of sentences that, though being strict-
ly speaking nonsensical, still make pretty good sense to us . At least 
they make good enough sense, when embedded in a practical situa-
tion, to qualify as coherent speech, in that what the speaker intends to 
convey does seem to be receiving loud and clear . However, once we set 
out to assign a semantics to the various parts of the respective sentences 
and the entire sentences themselves, our semantic analysis runs the risk 
of aborting . For no sense, in the formal semanticist’s sense, can be as-
signed to nonsense . Therefore, when attempting to carry out a semantic 
analysis, I recommend first making it unambiguous and explicit what 
the intended message is and only then feeding the resulting sanitized, 
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quasi-natural linguistic fragment into the machine of semantic analysis . 
This approach to natural-language analysis has as a consequence that 
when we say we are analyzing natural language, what we are really 
saying is that we are analyzing logically idealized fragments of natural 
language, as though actual speakers had already primed their speech 
for logical analysis . The main reason formal semanticists are interest-
ed in natural language is not because it is natural (as opposed to the 
artificial languages of mathematics, logic, and the empirical sciences), 
but because it is unique in containing words and contexts that are not 
found in other kinds of language, not least words bearing on attitudinal 
and temporal modalities . 
A prominent example of raw data I have in mind stems from Nun-
berg (adapted from ibid ., pp . 20ff) . Somebody is a condemned prisoner, 
already facing the firing squad, but then utters the following just before 
the final curtain:
“Traditionally, I am entitled to a last meal .”
We know what he means – which is not necessarily to know what the 
sentence means . The prisoner wants to be served a last meal, and to 
beef up his plea he invokes the tradition that someone who is a con-
demned prisoner is entitled to a last meal . But the sentence as it stands 
is nonsense, in the light sense of nonsense that its truth-condition can-
not possibly be satisfied – unless, of course, the prisoner in question 
has a track record as a condemned prisoner who was so far always 
executed and was on most occasions served a last meal .
The sentence “Traditionally, I am entitled to a last meal” is one that 
we, as formal semanticists active in the enterprise of logical analysis of 
natural language, should not attempt to analyze as is. What we should 
attempt to analyze is, in the first instance, how it got generated at all. 
This will give us a clue as to what should actually be analyzed. 
I suggest the sentence is the result of rolling two sentences into one . 
The first sentence would be,
“Traditionally, if somebody is a condemned prisoner then they 
are entitled to a last meal .”
The second sentence would be,
“I am a condemned prisoner .”
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Since the speaker knows the antecedent of the general sentence to 
apply to him, and knows that his audience knows this, he lops off the 
antecedent and feels free to substitute ‘I’ for the anaphoric pronoun 
‘they’ in the consequent that reaches back to ‘somebody’. This would 
have been appropriate, had it not been for the fact that the maneuvers 
take place inside the scope of the modifier denoted by ‘Traditionally’. 
Without the modifier, the maneuvers would have been these:
For all x, if x is a condemned prisoner then x is entitled to a last 
meal;
I am a condemned prisoner;
Therefore, I am entitled to a last meal .
In first-order predicate logic (pretending that the constant ‘a’ can repre-
sent an indexical such as ‘I’):
∀x (Ax ⊃ Bx) 
Aa 
∴ Ba
I suppose this little inference is the logical backbone of what enables 
the competent hearer to make sense of what the prisoner intends to 
say. But if the adverbial modification introduced by traditionally is ap-
pended to the first premise, thus expressing an exception-tolerant gen-
eralization over past events, the substitution of ‘a’ for ‘x’ is invalid, and 
so neither “Traditionally, Ba” nor “Ba” follows from the premises . Since 
‘Traditionally’ is also appended to the conclusion to generate “Tradi-
tionally, Ba”, the resulting argument turns out to be structurally identi-
cal to the well-known modal fallacy of necessitating the consequent:
 (∀x (Ax ⊃ Bx)) 
Aa 
∴  Ba
The first premise is de dicto, the second de	re, and so is the conclusion . 
The qualification of the relation between being an A and being a B 
as traditionally and necessarily obtaining, respectively, does not, of 
course, carry over to an individual a who is an A and qualify a as being 
traditionally or necessarily a B . 
If my take on Nunberg’s sentence has something going for it, I have 
shown how, on a logical reconstruction, a speaker takes two sentences, 
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“Traditionally, if somebody is a condemned prisoner then they are en-
titled to a last meal” and “I am a condemned prisoner”, and rolls them 
into one, “Traditionally, I am entitled to a last meal”, which is the one he 
utters . A hearer succeeding in making sense of this last sentence is, on 
a logical reconstruction, someone who disentangles the speaker’s sen-
tence into “Traditionally, if somebody is a condemned prisoner then 
they are entitled to a last meal” and “He [the speaker] is a condemned 
prisoner” and who realizes that the speaker has applied, wrongfully, 
the rule of universal instantiation inside the scope of traditionally . So 
the competent hearer is someone who both knows what the speaker 
intends to say and also knows that they are not saying it quite right .
This line of analysis, consisting in factoring one sentence out into 
two and spotting an illegitimate substitution of an indexical for a vari-
able, provides a template that can be applied to other of Nunberg’s ex-
amples . For instance, the sentence (adapted from Kijania-Placek’s (2010) 
adaption of Nunberg’s entry (59) in (ibid ., p . 29))
“Tonight is always the greatest party of the year”
might well be run-of-the-mill in a universe where time was cyclical, 
whereas in our linear universe it sticks out like a sore thumb . Again 
there is an illegitimate substitution inside the scope of a temporal modi-
fier, this time always . So how was “Always, tonight is the greatest party 
of the year” generated? (‘Always’ was placed at the head to indicate its 
intended scope.) We need a short background story to place ‘tonight’ 
in context . So assume that the sentence “Always,  . . .tonight . . .” was ut-
tered on, say, April 1st, 2011, during lunch at the main office of the 
Slovak Spelunking Society. Then the first sentence being factored out 
would be,
“Always, if a day y is April 1st then the greatest party of the year 
is on y in the evening .”
The second sentence would be,
“Today is April 1st, 2011 .”
These two sentences then get telescoped into,
“Always, today is the greatest party of the year in the evening .”
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Nunberg’s “Tonight is always the greatest party of the year” is simply 
a much more natural-sounding rephrasing of that last sentence . 
The Nunberg cases arguably extend beyond Nunberg . I would sug-
gest, for instance, that a sentence such as,
“If I were you I would enjoy my last meal”
can be analyzed using the same template as above, in that two sen-
tences have been rolled into one (though here we need not worry about 
substitution inside the scope of a modifier). What is tricky about this 
last sentence is, of course, its counterfactual antecedent, which, if taken 
literally, expresses a necessarily false proposition (given minimal as-
sumptions about the identity of individuals), and which, if not taken 
literally, requires a fair amount of hermeneutic charity to make sense 
of . Moreover, there is the well-known logical problem that since the an-
tecedent is true at no logically possible world, there is no world ‘close 
to’ the actual world at which it would be true . A standard move is to in-
voke logically impossible worlds at which the antecedent proposition is 
true in order to lubricate the standard, possible-world based Stalnaker-
Lewis interpretation of counterfactuals . But apart from general qualms 
about importing impossible worlds into the ontology of one’s semantic 
and logical theory, they seem out of place here, anyway, since natural 
language is about what is contingently true or contingently false (or 
contingently without a truth-value) and not what is necessarily true or 
necessarily false (or necessarily without a truth-value) . In short, invok-
ing impossible worlds in one’s analysis of “If I were you I would enjoy 
my last meal” would suggest, to me at least, that one’s analysis had 
gotten off on the wrong foot . (Just to be clear, Nunberg is not invoking 
impossible worlds .) 
Yet, despite the semantic and logical awkwardness of “If I were 
you”, we routinely do utter and understand sentences beginning with 
“If I were you” . The two sentences in question that “If I were you 
I would enjoy my last meal” is to be factored out into are, in my view, 
the following:
“If I were in situation X then I would do Y”
and
“You are in situation X” .
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By running these two sentences into one, we end up with, “If I were 
in your situation then I would do Y”, which is a perfectly sensible and 
reasonable English sentence that does not require us to attempt to make 
sense of or logically interpret a necessary falsehood . “If I were you”, 
on this analysis, serves as a shorter and perhaps more dramatic way of 
saying, “If I were in your situation” . 
An important general point is that nothing I have urged for concern-
ing any of these cases trades on any erratic behaviour of indexicals such 
as ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘tonight’, contrary to what Nunberg (1993) and Kijania-
Placek (2010) maintain . Maybe there is a need to allow for so-called 
descriptive use of indexicals, as Nunberg recommends in the light of 
the following diagnosis:
In context, the adverbs usually and always must be understood as 
involving quantification over instances, but these readings are not 
possible if the subjects of the sentences are interpreted as referring 
to individuals or particular times . So it is hard to see what coherent 
‘literal’ interpretations we could assign to such utterances [as the 
execution and party ones] . (Ibid ., p . 32)
And maybe there is no need to add descriptive use of indexicals . 
Perhaps such an addition would just be an artifact of a flawed seman-
tic analysis of cases where there appears to be a tension between the 
singularity of ‘I’ and ‘today’ and the generality of ‘traditionally’ and 
‘always’. And perhaps not. Though I would tend to think so, if for no 
other reason than that a purported analysandum such as “Tradition-
ally, I am entitled to a last meal” is, strictly speaking, nonsensical on 
a literal reading . Nunberg is right to suggest that the key to laying bare 
the intended sense behind uttering a sentence such as this consists in 
accounting for the duality of singularity and generality . Only his du-
ality revolves around ‘I’ picking out both a particular individual (the 
speaker) and whatever individual has the property of being a con-
demned prisoner, while my duality concerns two sentences (in one of 
which ‘I’ occurs and then only as a means of picking out the speaker). 
This is not to say that ‘I’ (or its counterparts in other languages) cannot, 
on other occasions, be deployed as a vehicle of general reference . It can; 
for instance, when the speaker pretends to be taking himself or herself 
as being representative of a group of people with shared interests or 
features, perhaps in the fashion of voicing the inner monologue of each 
member of the group . (For discussion, see Zobel 2010 .)
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If we factor out “Traditionally, P” into two sentences, one singular, 
the other general, it will not even begin to seem as though, at least on 
some occasions, indexicals would have the semantics (as opposed to 
pragmatics) of vehicles of general reference . Hence the view I am advo-
cating is at variance with the one advocated by Kijania-Placek, since in 
my view literal and standard use of indexicals does not have the option 
of expressing general propositions:
[I]ndexicals can be used to express either singular or general pro-
positions depending on whether they are used demonstratively or 
descriptively . (Ibid ., p . 140)
What I just said about “Traditionally, I am entitled to a last meal” 
being literally nonsensical is certainly not intended to imply that a se-
mantic theory, i .e . a theory of linguistic sense, should not also account 
for linguistic nonsense . It should; in general, a theory must account 
not only for the success cases but also for the fail cases. But, first, it 
is a methodological constraint that one’s semantic theory as applied 
to sense should carry over seamlessly to nonsense, with no semantic 
theory earmarked especially for nonsense; and secondly, instances of 
nonsense do not get analyzed as though they were literally sensible. 
The morale, I suggest, is that sloppy and nonsensical speech, jazzy 
as it may be, is not what gets logically analyzed: crisp speech is. And 
crisp speech, in the case of logical analysis of natural language, is 
a cleaned-up surrogate of sloppy or nonsensical, but natural, speech . 
The enterprise of logical analysis of natural language is feasible only 
because what gets logically analyzed is quasi-natural language. If you 
know what I mean .
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